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S . Army ges~arcy Institutel (If applicable) r the behavioral and Social -Sciences I PERI-RG 6c. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code) 7b. This report explores the effects of various reenlistment policies and incentives on first-term reenlistment intentions. It addresses the effects of Army advertising, reenlistment bonuses, and the promotion system on reenlistment intentions. The results present a baseline of information that may be useful for future research. The information presented in this report may provide options for considering force management alternatives in the post-downsizing era.
Participation of the U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences (ARI) in this effort is part of an ongoing research program designed to enhance the quality of Army personnel. This work is an essential part of the mission of ARI's Manpower and Personnel Policy Research Group (MPPRG) to conduct research to improve the Army's capability to effectively and efficiently recruit its personnel requirements. This research task was sponsored by the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (DSCPER) The effects of various Army reenlistment policies and incentives are critical concerns for Army policymakers and planners. This information can be used to determine the effects of implementing a proposed policy or incentive to achieve a desired reenlistment objective.
This report explores the effects of various reenlistment policies and incentives on first-term reenlistment intentions and behavior. It addresses the specific effects of Army advertising, personnel policies, reenlistment bonuses, and the promotion system on reenlistment intentions. The effect of advertising themes on reenlistment intentions of first-term soldiers was requested by the DCSPER. Additional analyses were requested by the Professional Development Branch for Enlisted Personnel under DMPM to explore reenlistment intentions. Analyses included the comparison of initial with current intentions to reenlist, the comparison of current intentions with behavior, and reenlistment intentions based on specific policies and incentives.
Findings:
The results demonstrate that opportunities to attend college, large cash bonuses, and a supportive chain of command increase the likelihood of reenlistment. The results further indicate that reenlistment behavior can be predicted from current reenlistment intentions.
Utilization of Findings:
The results of this report will serve as an information source for policymakers and planners to determine the effect of vii reenlistment incentives on reenlistment intentions. In addition, the results will provide information on the perception of selected personnel policies. For example, Smith (1988) reported that an individual's organizational commitment positively influenced reenlistment intentions when it was mediated by satisfaction and civilian opportunity. 1 Military experience also influences reenlistment decisions. Motowidlo, Dunette, & Rosse (1980) showed that as length of service increased, the intention to reenlist became more clearly defined.
Organizational factors that positively influenced reenlistment included reenlistment bonuses, basic pay, and retirement benefits (Horne & Gilroy, 1991) .
Factors such as Selective Reenlistment Bonuses, grade increases, and pay increases were also found to positively influence reenlistment decisions (Scheirer, Wilson, & Ingram, 1985; Tinney, 1991) .
In recent years, the Army has increasingly turned to advertising as an additional medium to encourage quality firstterm soldiers to reenlist. Research on the effects of advertising has focused on those initially entering the Army rather than first-term reenlistment (Benedict, Elig, & Kopischke, 1987; Elig, Weltin, & Johnson, 1984) .
Little, if any, research has focused on second and third-term soldiers.
Research on the reenlistment decision process traditionally uses reenlistment intention as the unit of analysis rather than reenlistment behavior. The latter is more difficult to track for Army populations despite its considerable theoretical interest to behavioral scientists and practical importance for Army policy makers.
The relationship between intention and behavior in the psychological literature shows moderate to high positive correlations. Fishbein and Ajzen (1975) propose a classic model of the intention-behavior relationship that has been extensively evaluated. A recent meta-analysis of the intention-behavior literature demonstrated that intentions are highly predictive of 1 This report is based partially on follow-up work conducted by Dr. Smith before his departure from ARI.
He developed the qcuestions analyzed in this report and included them as part of the Recruit Experience Tracking Survey (RETS).
behavicr (Sheppard, Hartwick, & Warshaw, 1988) .
The cited studies report moderate (r = .29) to strong correlations (r = .94) between intention and behavior. An ARI study of military personnel reported logistic regression results which demonstrated that positive intentions to join the military were the strongest predictor of actual enlistments (Nord, Schmitz, & Weiland, 1986) .
Rationale/Purpose
The 1986-1987 New Recruit Survey (NRS) and the 1989 Recruit Experience Tracking Survey (RETS) represent important information sources for U. S. Army personnel policymakers and planners. Sponsorship requests for the RETS were sent to the U.S. Army Recruiting Command, the Office of the Director of Military Personnel Management (DMPM), and the U.S. Army Reserve Officer Training Corps Cadet Command (Benedict, 1990) .
Under the direction of the sponsors, questionnaire items were developed to include in the 1989 RETS.
So.te items reflected requests from the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (DCSPER) in 1988 and the Director of the Department of Military Personnel Management (DMPM).
Items reflecting the effect of advertising themes on reenlistment intentions of first-term soldiers was requested by the DCSPER.
The effect of various personnel policies on reenlistment intentions was of interest to the Professional Development Branch for Enlisted Personnel under DMPM. The comparison of initial with current intentions to reenlist, active duty status, and reenlistment intentions based on specific policies and incentives were also requested.
This report 7xplores the impact of several rcenlistment policies and incentives on first-term reenlistment intentions and behavior. Of interest are the perceived effects of Army advertising, personnel policies, reenlistment bonuses, and the promotion system on reenlistment intentions. The report also examines the relationship between reenlistment intentions and behavior. This information can be used to determine the feasibility of implementing advertising policy options or other incentives to achieve desired reenlistment objectives.
Method
Soldiers were initially surveyed at reception battalions (N = 14,737) with the NRS and were resurveyed at their duty stations from April-June 1989 with the RETS.
The overall response rate for the RETS was 38%, which yielded a final sample of 4,234 enlisted soldiers.
Selected variables from the Enlisted Master File (EMF) and the gain/loss records as of 31 August 1989 from Personnel Information Systems Command (PERSINSCOM) were matched with the RETS data. These files provided demographic and military characteristics that supplemented the survey data. Additional EMF and Cohort files were utilized to track active duty status as of 31 December 1990. Reenlistment behavior was operationalized from the active duty status variable.
The analyses were conducted to determine the potential effect of Army advertising, various personnel policies, bonus amounts, and incentives on reenlistment intentions (see Appendix A).
Additional analyses of active duty status as of 31 December 1990 and reenlistment " tentions were conducted. Initial intentions were measured wy items from the NRS while current intentions were measured by items from the RETS. The final analyses described educational program participation, attitudes toward educatioit, and perceptions of promotion policies.
Results
The majority of the RETS respondents were high school graduates (93%) with 4% of the soldiers reporting education beyond the high school level. Based on Armed Forces Qualification Test Category (AFQT), the Test Categories (MCAT) for RETS respondents were: 7% in Category I, 37% in Category II, 54% in Category IIIA and IIIB, and 2% in Category IVA. Approximately 63% of the RETS soldiers were stationed at locations in the continental U.E. (CONUS).
Reenlistment Intentions
Soldiers were asked to indicate the likelihood of staying in the Army until retirement. Overall, 12% of soldiers reported they would stay in the Army until retirement. This represented a 19% decline from their initial career intentions. In addition, soldiers were asked if they intend to reenlist, but not make the Army a career. Currently, 23% said they would reenlist, but not make the Army a career. Some of the soldiers planned to continue their Army affiliations by joining the Army Reserve, joining the National Guard, or joining college ROTC. Figure 1 shows the comparison of reported initial intentions with current intentions to stay in the Army.
Soldiers were asked to indicate the likelihood of leaving the Army to find civilian emloyment, to attend college, and to attend vocational/technical school.
Based on self reports of current intentions, 69% of the soldiers intended to leave the Army after this enlistment tor civilian employment. This represented a 25% increase over their initial preference for a civilian career. The comparison of reported initial intentions compared with current intentions to leave the Army is presented in Figure 2. lmpact of Policy Alternatives A number of personnel policies and incentives were proposed to soldiers to determine whether a specific change would affect their reenlistment decision. Questions involving changes to a soldier's Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) in order to manage the force or respond to a soldier's desire for a career change showed differences in reenlistment intentions. Overall, 76% of the soldiers said they would not reenlist if they wanted to change their MOS, but could not. If soldiers were required to change their MOS to reenlist, 41% said they would not reenlist. These results may be useful to consider for current force downsizing efforts.
In the RETS questions concerning reenlistment alternatives and decisions, respondents were asked about cash reenlistment bonuses. Only 36% of the soldiers reported they would reenlist if they received a $4,000 bonus. When soldiers were presented with bonus amounts increasing to $20,000, ultimately 79% said they would reenlist. This suggests a firm 21% who are not interested in reenlistment. The empirical inteipretation from these data would question the assumption that all service members will respond to increasing cash bonuses in critical MOS (see Tinney, 1991) .
Educational opportunities were a strong factor in the reenlistment decision. Overall, 71% of the soldiers reported they would reenlist if they had duty time off to attend college, while 53% said they would reenlist if the Army would grant them a year off without pay to attend college. Only 42% claimed they would reenlist if they could transfer their GI Bill/Army College Fund (ACF) to a family member.
Many soldiers reported that a supportive military environment is a positive influence in the reenlistment decision process. A majority of the soldiers (73%) reported that a supportive chain of command was a positive influence in their reenlistment decision. This is an important finding that suggests the critical role that senior noncommissioned officers (NCC'c) and officers may play.
In contrast, the impact of advertising themes on reenlistment intentions was analyzed through items focusing on Army advertising perceptions. Overall, 72% of the soldiers felt that reenlistment advertising had no effect on their reenlistment decision. However, 46% of the soldiers reported they did not know whether reenlistment advertising focuses on continued service in the Army. Only 29% of the soldiers reported that Army advertising made them feel good about being in the Army. A majority (76%) of the RETS soldiers felt that the Army advertising does not realistically depict Army life.
Reenlistment Behavior
As of 31 December 1990, 54% (n = 2,277) of the RETS soldiers were on active duty, 45% (n = 1,897) left the Army, and 1% (n = 60) voluntarily reenlisted during Operation Desert Shield during the fall of 1990. Soldiers that left the Army within their expiration of term of service date (ETS) were defined as the loss group (n = 1,682) and those that were on active duty and reenlisted within ETS date were considered the reenlistment group (n = 753).
The reenlistment rate was approximately 31%.
Active duty soldiers that had ETS dates after 31 December 1990 (D = 1,524) were not included in the analyses. Soldiers that left the Army and then voluntarily reenlisted as part of Operation Desert Storm were not included in the analyses.
In addition, soldiers that left the Army prior to their ETS dates (n = 215) were excluded.
Demographics. The reenlistment group and the loss group demonstrated slightly different characteristics on military and demographic measures. Overall, 11% of the reenlistment group were women compared to the 9% of the loss group. Over 60% of those that reenlisted, compared to 31% of those that left the Army were from CONUS locations. Approximately 43% of the reenlistment group were Category I and II, while 46% of the loss group were Category I and II.
Soldiers that left the Army had slightly higher mean General Technical (GT) scores (109.87) on the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) than those that reenlisted (108.39).
For both groups, 96% of the soldiers had a high school diploma.
Reenlistment intentions versus behavior. The correspondence between current reenlistment intentions and behavior was quite high. Overall, 40% of the soldiers that reenlisted in the Army had intended to reenlist but not make the Army a career. Approximately 20% of the soldiers that reenlisted had intended to stay in the Army until retirement. For soldiers who left the Army, 84% planned to obtain civilian employment while 81% planned to attend college. A comparison of current intentions to stay in the Army with behavior and a comparison of current intentions to leave the Army with behavior is presented in Figures 3 and 4 , respectively.
Intention to reenlist and reenlistment behavior were classified as dichotomous variables. Current intentions were based on the following questions from the RETS, "How likely is it that after enlistment you will.. .reenlist, but probably make the Army a career or ...stay in the Army until I retire?" Responses of "probably or definitely" to either of these questions were coded as the intention to reenlist (1).
Any other responses to these questions were coded at the intention to not reenlist (0). Initial intentions were based on similarly worded items from the NRS and were coded dichotomously.
Reinlistment behavior was based on membership in the reenlistment group (1) or the loss group (0).
The Pearson correlation between current reenlistment intentions (RETS) and behavior was moderate (r =.43, p = .0001, n = 2,435).
The relationship between initial intentions reported at entry into the Army (NRS) and reenlistment behavior was low, but significant, (r = .14, p = .0001, n = 2,435).
In addition, the correlation between initial intentions (NRS) reported at entry 
Perception of Personnel Policies
Soldiers also were asked to give their perceptions of personnel and policy issues of interest to the sponsors. These issues involved the appropriateness of current criteria for promotions (including enlistment length, MOS ceilings, Skill Qualification Test (SQT) scores and point allocation), reenlistment, and the importance of education.
Promotion issues.
Overall, 46% of the soldiers reported that promotions based on enlistment length were unfair, while 59% of the soldiers reported that promotions based on MOS ceilings were unfair. Almost 9% of the soldiers claimed that the SQT should not be a prerequisite for promotion. Interestingly, soldiers that agreed the SQT should be a prerequisite for promotion had higher mean SQT scores (77.3) than those that did not agree (70.1).
The perceptions of point allocation from various sources was also requested by the sponsors. Overall, 54% and 55% of the soldiers reported that too few points were given for awards and physical training (PT), respectively. Reenlistment issues. Overall, 13% of the soldiers reported that passing the SQT should not be required for reenlistment eligibility. Soldiers agreeing that the SQT should be required for reenlistment eligibility also had higher mean SQT scores (77.9) than those not agreeing (71.1). About half of the soldiers felt that reenlistment and promotion preferences should be given to soldiers with higher SQT scores.
Another area of interest to the sponsors was the reported reenlistment incentive preferences of cash bonus amounts (ranging from $4,000 to $20,000) versus promotion to E-5 in 45 months. For the lowest bonus amount, 23% of the soldiers preferred a $4,000 bonus while 77% preferred a promotion. For the highest bonus amount, 94% of the soldiers preferred a $20,000 bonus while only 7% preferred a promotion.
Educational issues. Educational program participation while on active duty and attitudes toward obtaining a college degree in the Army were key concerns of the sponsors. Overall, 81% of the soldiers believed that a college degree is very important, and 50% claimed that a college education is important for success in the Army. Approximately 73% of the soldiers felt that obtaining a college education while in the Army was difficult. Almost 60% of the soldiers were unable to get duty time off for college courses, and 66% found that field exercises and training interfere with off duty education. Despite these difficulties, 34% of the soldiers were able to participate in some form of educational activity while on active duty.
Discussion
An exploratory analysis of the RETS suggests that several factors influence the reenlistment process positively. Other factors have a neutral or negative impact on reenlistment intentions. Greater opportunities for advanced education, large cash bonuses, and a supportive chain of command structure are factors that positively influence the intention to reenlist.
A decrease in the percentage of soldiers that intend to stay in the Army until retirement may be attributable to many factors. At initial entry into the Army, soldiers have little knowledge of Army life and have little information to develop specific military career goals. It is reasonable to expect that as length of time in the military increases, the decision to reenlist or leave the Army would be clearer. Over half of the soldiers plan to serve in the Army after their current enlistment. Tinney (1991) also provides insight into the economic incentives and self-selection processes associated with Army enlisted careers and reenlistments.
Changes in MOS based on choices made by the individual soldier or by the Army have a differential impact on the reenlistment decision. The policy of reenlistment based on a mandatory change in MOS may generate fewer reenlistments. Soldiers also appear much less likely to reenlist if they desire an MOS change, but are unable to change. Opportunities to observe these effects may be possible with the impending downsizing of the force. These data suggest, however, that emphasizing Army requirements and needs rather than personal preference for an MOS may minimize reenlistment losses.
Educational opportunities represent a positive influence and potential policy tool for the reenlistment decision process. The majority of the soldiers indicated their intention to reenlist if the Army would provide adequate time for college courses during duty time. At least half intend to reenlist if the Army would allow a year off without pay to attend college.
In addition to college opportunities, cash bonus amounts offer another incentive to reenlist. Lower bonus amounts are less likely to influence reenlistment intentions than higher bonus amounts. A majority of the soldiers would reenlist at bonus amounts of $20,000. A large cash bonus as an incentive to reenlist is further supported by the preference for a high cash bonus over a promotion.
Both educational benefits and high bonus amounts are strong incentives to reenlist. If these were presented as a package, it is possible that more soldiers would reenlist. This would be a particularly desirable option for soldiers who intend to use educational opportunities to advance their career in the Army. For critical shortage MOS and a declining selective reenlistment bonus (SRB) budget, such a benefit combination might be a useful policy option.
An important and hopeful finding of this research is the influential role that a supportive chain of command plays in the reenlistment decision process. Information regarding reenlistment should be implemented at the junior leadership level to encourage first-term soldiers to reenlist. Information campaigns regarding reenlistment could be implemented through the chain of command, in support of or in place of reenlistment advertising cam -aigns, which do not appear to exert strong effects. However, whether a "sleeper effect" may be involved --an enhancement of reenlistment behavior long after the advertising has passed --is beyond the scope of this research (Gruder, Cook, Hennigan, Flay, Alessis, & Halamaj, 1978) .
Measuring attitudes is an alternative to an experimental evaluation of the impact of advertising. Based on the results, advertising appears to have no effect on the reenlistment decision process and does not address issues regarding continued Army service. Generally, advertising is not perceived favorably by the soldiers.
The evaluation of the impact of advertising on the reenlistment process is also not directly testable by this research effort. Ideally, an experimental study could be conducted in which soldiers are exposed to a series of advertising strategies designed to increase reenlistments. To determine the impact of the strategies, reenlistment rates for soldiers exposed to the advertising would be compared to soldiers not exposed to any advertising. This research was not designed to test this research question.
Reenlistment Intentions versus Behaviors
A comparison of reenlistment intentions with reenlistment behavior suggests that current intentions are good predictors of behavior. Specifically, the intention to reenlist, but not make the Army a career and the intention to stay in the Army until retirement are "good" predictors of reenlistment behavior. Over 18% of the variation in reenlistment behavior can be accounted for by current reenlistment intentions. These results are consistent with other studies cited which report moderate correlations between behavior and intention. The results further demonstrate that initial intentions (assessed by the NRS), are relatively weak predictors of reenlistment behavior.
The use of intentions in reenlistment decision research is a valid approach. Based on the correlations, soldiers who intend to reenlist are more likely to reenlist. The impact of incentives and personnel policies designed to increase reenlistment behavior can be adequately assessed through reported intentions. Incentives and policies that increase reenlistment intentions are likely to influence reenlistment behavior as well. However, it may ultimately be most useful to target the timing, audience, and message content much more carefully. Intentions are the "best" predictors of behavior when the temporal relationship between intention and behavior is small (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1977; Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980) .
Perceptions of Personnel Policies
The analyses suggest that some personnel policies are not viewed favorably. Promotions based on MOS shortage are seen as unfair, and more promotion points are desired for awards, PT, and civilian education. Negative perceptions of promotion policies could lead to generalized dissatisfaction with the Army and fewer reenlistments. Alternatively, the Army may wish to examine its own advertising about organizational needs in order to stress a combination of requirements necessary for appropriate force structure and functioning.
The data regarding promotion criteria and reenlistment eligibility suggest that soldiers performing higher on the SQT believe in its utility. Whether promotion and reenlistment preference as a criterion for promotion will be given to soldiers with higher scores on the SQT is a continuing research concern. The relative importance of promotion criteria such as awards or advanced military and civilian education were not addressed in this research.
It is important for Army leaders and policy makers to note that advanced education is important to many of the soldiers. This is an Army "value," i.e., training and education, that soldiers are taking to heart. Obtaining a college degree is perceived as an important component of success in the Army. There is a time conflict for soldiers who attend college while on active duty. Though a majority believe there is a time conflict, some of the soldiers are able to participate in educational programs. Analysis of the participation in various types of educational programs further demonstrates that time is an obstacle for soldiers. This was supported by the frequency in which college correspondence courses were attended.
Summary and Conclusions
This research examined three dominant incentives or policies which positively influence the reenlistment decision process. Opportunities for advanced education, higher bonus amounts, and a supportive chain of command are factors that could increase reenlistments for first-term soldiers.
Soldiers perceive advanced education as important for a military career, and many obtain college credit through correspondence courses. Granting soldiers more time to complete college work would no doubt improve the overall quality of soldiers and would likely increase reenlistments. The results indicate that information regarding reenlistment opportunities directed through a supportive chain of command would increase reenlistments for first-term soldiers.
These results present a baseline of information that future research can enhance. The downsizing and force restructuring are providing soldiers and military manpower planners with numerous challenges and difficulties. However, the information presented in this report can provide options for considering force management alternatives in the post-downsizing era. In the interim, however, results presented here can be used as a basis to take necessary actions to improve the level of support from the chain of command and to use monetary and educational incentives to alter force structure in certain MOS.
APPENDIX A.
SELECTED QUESTIONNAIRE ITEMS (RETS)
15. Indicate if the following statements are TRUE or FALSE for you:
True False ®r () A I completed AIT in the MOS for which I contracted. 0 ) B. I dd not complete AIT in the MOS for which I contracted, BECAUSE I failed the AIT requirements ( ) C. I did not complete AIT in the MOS for which I contracted, BECAUSE I requested a change due to incomplete or false information provided by the ARMY before I signed n', contract. 0 Z D, I did not complete AIT in the MOS for which I contracted. BECAUSE I requested a change due to new interests.
(® E. I enlisted to get irained in job skills that are required for a specific civilian job 0 ® F I got the job skills training that I expected when I enlisted.
( D G The ARMY trained me during AIT primarily on specific ARMY equipment or tasks, and I don't expect these skills to transfer to civilian jobs. 
